We study the market selection hypothesis in complete financial markets, populated by heterogeneous agents. We allow for a rich structure of heterogeneity: individuals may differ in their beliefs concerning the economy, information and learning mechanism, risk aversion, impatience and 'catching up with Joneses' preferences. We develop new techniques for studying the long-run behavior of such economies, based on the Strassen's functional law of iterated logarithm. In particular, we explicitly determine an agent's survival index and show how the latter depends on the agent's characteristics. We use these results to study the long-run behavior of the equilibrium interest rate and the market price of risk.
Introduction
A fundamental question in the modern theory of financial economics is concerned with the so-called market selection hypothesis, dating back to the ideas of Friedman [16] . Motivated by the postulate that agents with inaccurate forecasts will eventually be driven out of the economy, this hypothesis can be stated informally as "If you are so smart, why aren't you rich?". Formally, market selection in financial markets examines the agents' long-run survival 1 capability and price impact in equilibrium models. There is a vast body of literature dealing with this topic; see e.g. Blume and Easley [7] , Cvitanić, Jouini, Malamud and Napp [8] , Nishide and Rogers [25] , Sandroni [27] , and Yan [32, 33] . This paper investigates the market selection hypothesis (or, natural selection, for short) and the long-run behavior of asset prices in a complete market setting with highly heterogeneous investors. Individuals may differ in their beliefs concerning the economy, information and learning mechanism, risk aversion, impatience (time preference rate) and degree of habit-formation. Each individual in our model is represented by a generalized version of the catching up with the Joneses power utility function of Chan and Kogan [9] . This model of preferences is sometimes referred to in the literature as exogenous habit-formation, since it incorporates the impact of a certain given stochastic process on the individual's consumption policy. Agents are assumed to possess only partial information regarding the events associated with the evolution of the market. More precisely, the stochastic dynamics of the mean growth-rate of the economy 2 are unobservable, and the agents' information set consists of the aggregate endowment and a publicly observable signal. Furthermore, agents are allowed to have diverse beliefs concerning the values of the initial and average mean growth-rate. Individuals may be irrational in the way they interpret the public signal: some of them may be over-(or, under-)confident about the informativeness of the public signal. We use the standard way of modeling over-(or, under-)confidence, originated in Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal [14] and Scheinkman and Xiong [28] : we assume that agents' beliefs concerning the instantaneous correlation of the public signal with the economy's growth-rate may differ from its actual value. 3 The agents are rational in the sense that they use a standard Kalman filter to update their expectations about the economy's growth-rate. The heterogeneous filtering rules yield highly non-trivial dynamics for the individual consumption and the equilibrium state price density, determined by the market clearing condition. In particular, subjective probability densities describing the agents' beliefs give rise to multiple new state variables, which govern the dynamics of the economy. We refer to Back [2] for a survey on filtering and incomplete information in asset pricing theory.
Let us describe the contribution of this work to the literature on equilibrium and natural selection. Firstly, as described above, we analyze a very general paradigm of heterogeneous economies including diverse beliefs, Kalman filtering and exogenous state-dependent habit formation preferences. We provide a comprehensive description of the equilibrium characteristics, that can be used for further research in other possible directions. Secondly, this complex setting in turn allows detecting which traits (both behavioral-preferential and information-related) are beneficial for survival. That is, as in Yan [32] , we reveal that there is a unique surviving agent in the long-run. Moreover, we show that the interest rate and the market price of risk behave asymptotically as those of an economy, populated solely by this surviving agent. Lastly, to derive our results, we develop new techniques based mainly on the Strassen's functional law of iterated logarithm. To the best of our knowledge, these methods have never been used in the general equilibrium literature before.
The conclusions and implications on natural selection are as follows. Most importantly, our findings indeed confirm, to a large extent, the validity of the market selection hypothesis.
In a growing economy, the less effectively risk-averse 4 agent is the one to survive in the long-run. This result is consistent with previous studies (see e.g. Cvitanić, Jouini, Malamud, and Napp [8] ). However, the impact of habit-formation on the effective risk aversion, and thus in particular on survival, is quite novel. As it turns out, if the (standard non-effective) risk aversion coefficient is above one, then the individual with the strongest habit will survive. Intuitively, this makes sense, as aggressiveness in a growing economy among somewhat moderate individuals is supposed to be a plus. On the other hand, if the (standard non-effective) level of risk aversion is below one (i.e., individuals are relatively risk-seeking in the classical sense), the agent with the lowest degree of habit-formation will dominate. This is not surprising at all, as excess aggressiveness can cause bubbles leading to extinction.
Some of our conclusions concerning the interaction of diverse beliefs and survival are quite intriguing, and seem to be quite hard to predict without a delicate analysis.
When agents differ only in their beliefs concerning the average mean growth-rate, the one with the most accurate forecast will dominate the market, as expected. If all agents are over-confident (or under-confident), then, again, the agent with the best guess will beat the others. However, if some agents are over-confident and others are under-confident, the situation is more complex. For instance, it may happen that in a situation where the public signal provides some relevant information about the market, the surviving agent will be the one who (wrongly) believes that this signal is a pure noise, whereas the agent who is significantly overconfident in the informativeness of the signal will be eliminated from the economy. Furthermore, in some cases, agents that believe in a negative correlation of the signal will survive, while individuals who believe in a (too high) positive correlation will be extinct, despite an actual positive correlation. See Figure 1 for an example describing these phenomena. Even though it is somewhat debatable which property of the preceding two can be considered a more rational one, we still learn that theoretically, the market selection hypothesis is valid, at least in some modified form.
We now review some related works. The most closely related to ours are the papers by Yan [32] and Cvitanić, Jouini, Malamud and Napp [8] . 5 Specifically, these authors consider a special case of our model corresponding to the case when there is no learning and agents having standard CRRA preferences without any habit formation. In terms of modeling heterogeneous beliefs and learning, our model 4 In our model, the effective risk aversion depends on the level of habit-formation (see (4.2)) 5 Bhamra and Uppal [5] , Dumas [13] , and Wang [29] considered the same model, but with only two agent types and heterogeneity coming only from risk aversion. closely follows the one of Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal [14] and Scheinkman and Xiong [28] , who considered a special case of our model: a two-agent economy with standard CRRA utility functions, and the public signal being a pure noise, uncorrelated with the economy's growth-rate. Chan and Kogan [9] consider a special case of our model with homogeneous 'catching up with the Joneses' habit levels and a continuum of agents with heterogeneous risk aversions. Xiouros and Zapatero [31] derive a closed form expression for the equilibrium state price density in the Chan and Kogan [9] model. Cvitanić and Malamud [10] study how long-run risk sharing depends on the presence of multiple agents with different levels of risk aversion. Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield [21] and Cvitanić and Malamud [11] study the interaction of survival and price impact in economies where agents derive utility only from terminal consumption. Fedyk, Heyerdahl-Larsen and Walden [15] extend the model of Yan [32] by allowing for many assets. Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield [22] study the link between survival and price impact in the presence of intermediate consumption, and allow for general utilities with unbounded relative risk aversion and a general dividend process. Another quite significant direction of the complete market risk sharing literature concentrates on the equilibrium effects of heterogeneous beliefs. Bhamra and Uppal [6] derive a characterization of the equilibrium state price density by means of infinite series that admits a closed form solution for specific coefficients, in a two-agent economy with diverse beliefs and heterogenous CRRA preferences. With CRRA agents differing only in their beliefs, the equilibrium state price density can be derived in a closed form, and thus many equilibrium properties can be analyzed in detail. See, e.g., Basak [3, 4] , Jouini and Napp [19, 20] , Jouini, Martin and Napp [18] and Xiong and Yan [30] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and provide some preliminary results. Section 3 is devoted to a brief description of the equilibrium state price density in homogeneous and heterogeneous settings. In Section 4, we present the main result of the paper and discuss some implications. Section 5 deals with some auxiliary results that are crucial for the proof of the main result. In Section 6 we prove the main result. Finally, in Section 7 we establish long-run results for the interest rate and the market price of risk. Some of the results appearing in sections 5 and 7 are of an independent mathematical interest.
Preliminaries
We consider a continuous-time Arrow-Debreu economy with an infinite horizon, in which heterogeneous agents maximize their utility functions from consumption. The uncertainty in our model is captured by a (complete) probability space (Ω, F ∞ , P ) and a continuous filtration F := (F t ) t∈[0,∞) , with F 0 = {∅, Ω}. We fix three standard and independent Wiener processes (W (i) t ) t∈[0,∞) , i = 1, 2, 3, adapted to the filtration F . There are N different types of agents in the economy, labeled by i = 1, ..., N. Each agent i is equipped with a non-negative endowment process ǫ i t t∈[0,∞) adapted to the filtration G (see (2.7)). We denote by D t := N i=1 ǫ i t the aggregate endowment process and assume that (D t ) t∈[0,∞) satisfies
where the constant σ D > 0 represents the volatility. The mean growth-rate (µ D t ) t∈[0,∞) is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process that solves uniquely the SDE
where µ, µ 0 and σ µ are some real numbers and ξ > 0. The numbers µ, µ 0 will be referred to as the average and initial mean growth-rate, respectively.
2.1. The Financial Market. We consider a financial market that consists of at least two long-lived securities: a risky stock (S t ) t∈[0,∞) and a bank account (S 0 t ) t∈[0,∞) . In addition to this, there are other (not explicitly modeled) assets guaranteeing that the market is dynamically complete 6 for G adapted claims (where the filtration G := (G t ) t∈[0,∞) is defined in (2.7)). We emphasize that this filtration coincides with the symmetric information shared by all agents. The bond is in zero net supply and the stock is a claim to the total endowment of the economy (D t ) t∈[0,∞) and has a net supply of one share. The risk-less bond is given by S 0 t = e t 0 rsds , where (r t ) t∈[0,∞) is the risk-free rate process. We assume a unique positive state price density denoted by (M t ) t∈[0,∞) , that is, a positive adapted process to G that satisfies
In this setting, the model can be implemented by a complete securities market with a unique state price density derived in equilibrium (as for instance in Duffie and Huang [12] ). More specifically, the filtration G is generated by the Brownian motion st (which is interpreted as a public signal) and the aggregate endowment process Dt. Nevertheless, as explained in Remark 2.2, the filtration G is also generated by the Brownian motions st and W (0) t . Thereby, the market can be completed by adding one additional security to St. However, since the price of this security would be determined endogenously, one would have to verify endogenous completeness. This can be done by using the techniques of Hugonnier, Malamud and Trubowitz [17] . Otherwise, we can just assume that there are sufficiently many (derivative) assets, completing the market.
for all t > 0. Note that our assumption excludes arbitrage opportunities in the model. The state price density, as well as all other parameters, are to be derived endogenously in equilibrium. 
from consumption, under the constraints that the consumption stream (c it ) t∈[0,∞) is a positive process adapted to G (which is defined in (2.7)) and lies in the budget set
Here, E Pi [·] stands for the expectation with respect to the subjective probability measure P i of agent i. The exact form of P i is specified in (2.15) . We assume that all agents are represented by 'catching up with the Joneses 7 ' preferences:
The subjective 'standard of living' index (H it ) t∈[0,∞) is defined through a certain geometric average of the aggregate endowment process. We consider here a more general specification for H it than the one in Chan and Kogan [9] . Namely, we set H it = e βixt , for some β i ≥ 0, where (2.5)
x t = e −λt x 0 + λ t 0 e λs log(D s )ds , or equivalently, (x t ) t∈[0,∞) solves the SDE
For each agent i, the number β i measures the impact of the index x t on the agent; in particular, when β i = 0, the agent is not influenced by the index at all. For large β i , the influence is somewhat heavy. In complete markets, the optimal consumption stream can be easily derived as in the following statement.
Proposition 2.1. The optimal consumption stream of agent i, in a complete market represented by a state price density (M t ) t∈[0,∞) , is given by
7 This paradigm of a utility function was first introduced in Abel [1] , and is commonly referred to in the literature as a utility with exogenous habits. This specification describes a decision maker who experiences an impact of the 'standard of living' index.
where the density process (Z it ) t∈[0,∞) is given in (2.15) .
Proof. The assertion follows by standard duality arguments involving the firstorder conditions. Finally, we introduce the notion of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
is the optimal consumption stream of agent i and (M t ) t∈[0,∞) is the state price density that represents the market. b. The market clearing condition is satisfied:
for all t > 0.
2.3.
Diverse Beliefs and Learning. The are two processes in the economy that are observable by all agents. The first one is the aggregate endowment process (D t ) t∈[0,∞) , and the second one is a certain public signal
for some φ ∈ [0, 1). That is, the public signal exhibits a non-negative correlation φ ∈ [0, 1) with the shock governing the mean growth-rate process. The corresponding filtration is denoted by
In contrast to this, the mean growth-rate process is unobservable. That is, neither of the agents possesses access to the data revealing the dynamics of the process (µ D t ) t∈[0,∞) . Furthermore, agents may have diverse beliefs concerning the average and initial mean growth-rate. More precisely, each agent i believes that the initial mean growth-rate is some µ 0i ∈ R and that the average mean growth-rate is some µ i ∈ R. That is to say, before filtering, agent i assigns in his mind the following model for µ D t :
Furthermore, individuals may have an irrational perception of the signal. Concretely, each agent i believes that the public signal
, when if fact, the correlation is φ ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, under the belief of agent i, the following model is attributed to the signal s t :
We denote by Q i the measure corresponding to agent's i−th beliefs regarding the models in (2.8) and (2.9), where W
are independent Wiener processes under Q i . Consequently, agents are in the process of learning and filtering out the dynamics of the mean growth-rate, which is deduced by using the theory of optimal filtering. Definition 2.2. The process
is called the subjective mean growth-rate of agent i.
and the variance process
G t is deterministic and given by
Proof. Observe that Theorem 12.7 in Liptser and Shiryaev [24] implies that µ D it t∈[0,∞) satisfies the following SDE
where the variance process ν it is detected through the following Riccati ODE
with ν i0 = 0. One can solve the above equation and verify that ν it is given by (2.12) . Now, we shall solve the SDE (2.13). By definition, we have y ′ it = (ξ + νit (σ D ) 2 )y it , and y i0 = 1. Notice that the preceding observation combined with Ito's formula implies that
completing the proof.
Remark 2.1. Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal [14] consider the static version of (2.10).
That is, the functions ν it and y it are substituted by the corresponding asymptotic limits. This can be justified by Lemma 5.3 of the current paper.
We denote by i = 0 a fictional agent who is rational in the sense that he knows the correct average, initial mean growth-rate and the correlation parameter φ. Let us denote by µ D 0t := E P µ D t G t the estimated mean growth-rate of this agent. As in Proposition 2.2, we have
where y 0t and ν 0t are defined similarly to (2.11) and (2.12) . It can be shown, as in Theorem 8.1 in Liptser and Shiryaev [23] , that W
ds is a P −Brownian motion with respect to the filtration G.
Remark 2.2. The filtration G is generated by the public signal s t and the Brownian motion W (0) t . To see this, note that
and
We set
to be the i−th agent's error in the mean growth-rate estimation. The dynamics of (D t ) t∈[0,∞) from the i−th agent's perspective admit the form
is a Brownian motion (by Girsanov's theorem) under the equivalent probability measure 8 P i and the filtration G, where
Let us stress that W (0) it is also a Q i −Brownian motion with respect to the filtration G. In particular, this implies that by restricting the measure Q i to the sigma-algebra generated by W (0) it , we get the measure P i . Nevertheless, the measures Q i and P (the physical probability measure) are singular on the sigma-algebra (see (2.8) and (2.9)) generated by the Brownian motions W
The Equilibrium State Price Density
In the current section we depict the structure of the equilibrium state price density in both settings of homogeneous and heterogeneous economies.
Homogeneous Economy.
Consider an economy where all agents are of the same type i, and denote by (M it ) t∈[0,∞) the corresponding equilibrium state price density. The homogeneity of the economy combined with the completeness of the market allows to derive the corresponding state price density in a closed form.
Lemma 3.1. The equilibrium state price density in a market populated by one agent of type i is given by
Proof. The assertion follows by using the market clearing condition and Lemma 2.1. We derive next the risk free-rate and the market price of risk in a homogeneous economy.
Lemma 3.2. The risk free rate and the market price of risk in an economy populated by one agent of type i, are given respectively by
Proof. Consider the process
The dynamics of M it are given by
where
The rest of the proof follows from the fact that the risk free rate and the market price of risk coincide with minus the drift and minus the volatility of the SPD respectively.
Heterogeneous Economy.
Consider an economy populated by N different types of agents. By Lemma 2.1, the optimal consumption stream of agent i is given by
where (M t ) t∈[0,∞) stands for the corresponding heterogeneous equilibrium state price density, and M it is given by (3.1). Therefore, the market clearing condition (2.6) admits the form
Example 3.1. Consider a homogeneous risk aversion economy, i.e., γ 1 = ... = γ N = γ. Then, the equilibrium state price density is given explicitly by
Furthermore, if the habits are homogeneous, that is,
If the beliefs among the agents are not varying, i.e., Z 1t = ... = Z N t = Z t , then, we have
Finally, we provide formulas for the risk free rate and the market price of risk.
1/γ j c jt denotes the relative level of absolute risk tolerance of agent i.
Proof. The proof is identical to the one of Proposition 4.1 in Cvitanić, Jouini, Malamud and Napp [8] .
The Main Result: The Long-Run Surviving Consumer
The current section is devoted to the study of the long-run behavior of the optimal consumption shares in a heterogeneous economy. We establish the existence of a surviving consumer in the market, i.e., an agent whose optimal consumption asymptotically behaves as the aggregate consumption. This dominating individual is determined through the survival index. The survival index is a quantity depending on individuals' characteristics and specifies the surviving agent versus the agents to be extinct in the economy. 
.
The following is assumed throughout the entire paper.
Assumption. There exists an agent I K whose survival index is the lowest one, namely κ IK < κ i , for all i = I K .
We are now ready to state our main result. for all i = I K , and
The survival index is a complicated function of the individuals' underlying parameters. In order to isolate the effects of various agents' characteristics on the long-run survival, we will discuss special cases in which agents differ with respect to only one or a few particular parameters.
4.1.
The Effect of Risk-Aversion and Habits. Let the initial priors (µ i ) i=1,...,N and the over-confidence parameters (φ i ) i=1,...,N be fixed and identical for all agents. As it will be seen in the proof of Theorem 4.1, the survival index is invariant under additive translation, and thus it is determined in the current setting by
If β 1 = ... = β N = 0, the survival index is the same as in Cvitanić, Jouini, Malamud and Napp [8] . In particular, in a growing economy (i.e. µ − (σ D ) 2 /2 > 0), the least risk-averse agent will survive in the long-run, as in the models of Yan [32] , and Cvitanić, Jouini, Malamud and Napp [8] . The presence of habits may change the behavior. Here, if the habit is sufficiently strong (β i > 1), the effect completely reverses: It is the most risk-averse agent who survives in the long-run. Effectively, 'catching up with Joneses' preferences change an agent's risk aversion from γ i to
Therefore, for strong habits, agents with a high risk-aversion effectively behave as agents with a low risk aversion. When risk aversion is homogeneous, the effect of habits strength on survival depends on whether risk aversion is above or below 1. If risk aversion is above 1, we get the surprising, and at first sight counter-intuitive result, that agents with stronger habits survive in the long-run. The reason for this is that the presence of habits forces the agent to trade more aggressively and make bets on very good realizations of the dividend in order to sustain the aggregate habit level generated by the 'catching up with the Joneses' preferences. This makes an agent with strong habits effectively less risk averse. This is beneficial for survival in a growing economy.
The Effect of Diverse Beliefs.
Consider an economy where agents may differ only with respect to their average mean growth-rate estimations (µ i ) i=1,...,N and their correlation parameters (φ i ) i=1,...,N . In this case, the survival index admits the form
Note that in this case the survival index is a decreasing function of the correlation parameter φ i in the interval [−1, φ], and an increasing function in the interval (φ, 1]. Therefore, in an economy where the only distinction between agents is their correlation parameters, the surviving agent is derived as follows. If either all agents are over-confident (φ < φ i , for all i = 1, ..., N ) or under-confident (φ > φ i , for all i = 1, ..., N ), then the survival index is given by If φ 1 ∈ −1, 2 aφ(1+a) aφ 2 +(a+1−φ) 2 − 1 , the second agent will survive. Now, assume that
, the second agent will survive; otherwise, namely, if φ 2 ∈ 2(a+1)φ−(a+1+φ 2 )φ1
, 1 , the first agent will survive. To demonstrate the above scheme numerically, let us consider the case where a = 1 and φ = 1/2 (see Figure 1 ). If φ 1 ∈ [−1, −0.2], then the second agent will survive. If φ 1 ∈ [−0.2, 0.5] , then: if φ 2 ∈ 0.5, 8−9φ1 9−4φ1 , the second agent is the one to survive. Otherwise, if φ 2 ∈ 8−9φ1 9−4φ1 , 1 then the first agent will survive. The preceding fact yields an economically surprising observation: too overconfident agents will not survive when they compete with agents that believe in a weak negative correlation. Assume, for instance, that the second agent believes that the correlation is some φ 2 ∈ [8/9, 1]. Then, if φ 1 ∈ [ 8−9φ2 9−4φ2 , 0], the first agent will survive, despite of the negative correlation. This is very surprising, since irrational agents who believe in a non-positive correlation happen to survive, whereas individuals with an overestimation of the signal will be extinct.
If the only source of heterogeneity in the economy is the belief regarding the average mean growth-rate, then the survival index depends only on the error between
First agent survives Second agent survives 
Therefore, the consumer with the best forecast of the average mean growth-rate is the one to dominate the market.
4.3.
The Relative Level of Absolute Risk Tolerance. As in Cvitanić, Jouini, Malamud and Napp [8] , we define the relative level of absolute risk tolerance of agent i by
The following is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.1. Proof. Note that (3.2) implies that
The preceding observations combined with Theorem 4.1 and the equality N i=1 ω it = 1 complete the proof of Corollary 4.1.
Auxiliary Results
In the present section we provide some results that will be crucial for proving Theorem 4.1. First, we introduce the following estimates, indicating that y it , 1/y it , their derivatives, and ν it are close to certain functions, of a simpler form. The errors in these estimates are shown to be decaying exponentially fast to 0, as t → ∞. Lemma 5.3. We have
for all t > 0 and some constant C > 0.
Proof. Inequality (5.1) is due to the fact that ν it − α i2 (σ D ) 2 = (αi1−αi2)αi2(σ D ) 2 αi1e 2(α i2 +ξ)t −αi2 . Next, by definition (see Proposition 2.2), it follows that y it admits the form
One checks that the inequality e x − 1 ≤ (e − 1)x, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 concludes the validity of (5.2). Recall that y it satisfies the ODE y ′ it = ξ + νit (σ D ) 2 y it , and thus we can estimate
which implies (5.3) by applying inequalities (5.1) with (5.2) . Inequalities (5.4) and (5.5) are proved in a similar manner.
For each d ≥ 1, we denote by C 0 [0, 1]; R d , || · || ∞ the space of all R d -valued continuous functions on the interval [0, 1] vanishing at 0 endowed with the sup topology.
Definition 5.4. We denote by
We note that K (d) is a compact subset of C 0 [0, 1]; R d (see Proposition 2.7, page 343, in Revuz and Yor [26] ). The next result deals with the asymptotics of certain multiple stochastic integrals. Proof. (i) First, note that a change of variable implies that Z t = t 0 e −2s W 1 2 (e 2s −1)
Note that F is a continuous functional. Indeed, for a fixed f ∈ C 0 ([0, 1]; R) and all ε > 0, let δ = ε(2||f || ∞ + ε) and observe that ||f − g|| ∞ < δ for some g ∈ C 0 ([0, 1]; R), implies |F (f ) − F (g)| < ε. It follows by Strassen's functional law of iterated logarithm (see Theorem 2.12, page 346, in Revuz and Yor [26] ) that P-a.s lim sup
Notice that sup h∈K (1) 
In particular, it follows that lim sup N →∞ N 0
This accomplishes the proof of part (i). 
. By the law of iterated logarithm, we have lim sup t→∞
and hence it is enough to concentrate on the asymptotics of the second term:
Note that φ( 1 2 (e 2s − 1)) ≤ e s √ log 2s and thus, the law of iterated logarithm implies that
This accomplishes the proof of part (ii). We proceed with the following statement. which vanishes according to (i).
In the next limit theorems, the main tool is ergodicity of certain stochastic processes. Similar ideas as below (even though we have provided a direct argument) could be applicable to deduce the previous lemma. Recall that e −at W e 2at and e −bt B e 2bt are two independent stationary Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes, thus the process e −(a+b)t W e 2at B e 2bt is stationary. Therefore, an ergodic theorem for stationary processes implies that Next, the process (
, for all s > 1. We define the process (B ′ t ) t∈[0,∞) in a similar manner. We emphasize that (W e 2a E W 2 e 2a = 1.
Finally, the above limit combined with similar arguments to those appearing in (i) concludes the proof.
(iii) The idea of the proof is to rewrite the required limit in terms of limits of the same form as those in (ii). First, observe that e −at s 0 e au dW u = W s −ae −at s 0 e au W u du. Thus we can rewrite, Observe that Fubini's theorem implies that The latter fact combined with part (ii) completes the proof.
The next statement is heavily based on the previous lemma. Parts (ii) and (iii) in Lemma 5.6 complete the proof of (i).
(ii) As before, one checks that the limit is equal to
and the rest is a consequence of parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 5.6.
(iii) The limit is equal to which vanishes due to part (i) of Lemma 5.6.
Proof of The Main Result
We provide here a proof for Theorem 4.1. Fix an arbitrary i = I K . Recall that N j=1 c jt = D t , and thus it suffices to show that lim t→∞ cit
In virtue of identity (3.1), we have
for all j = 1, ..., N. Therefore, in order to complete the proof of the statement, it suffices to show that
To this end, we proceed with the computation of the following limits.
Part I. We claim that
Recall that by (2.5) and (2.2), we have lim t→∞
Note that the law of large numbers implies that lim t→∞ Part II. We claim that
By definition (see (2.14) ), it suffices to verify that
holds for all j = 1, ..., N. It is not hard to check by employing Lemma 5.3 combined with the law of large numbers, that the preceding limit does not change when the functions y iu , 1 yiu and ν iu are substituted by e (αi2+ξ)t , e −(αi2+ξ)t and α i2 (σ D ) 2 , respectively. In view of the latter observation, by definition (see (2.10)), we need to show that One checks that the first two terms vanish by the law of large numbers. The third and fourth limits vanish by part (iii) and (ii) of Lemma 5.4, respectively. This completes the proof of the second part.
Part III. We have,
This can be derived by applying Lemmata 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. The proof is now accomplished by combining the above three parts, some routine algebraic transformations and the law of large numbers.
Interest Rate and Market Price of Risk: Further Long-Run Results
The current section deals with asymptotic results for the interest rate and the market price of risk in heterogeneous economies. More precisely, it is shown that asymptotically, the latter parameters behave as those associated with a homogeneous economy populated by the dominating consumer. Under some mild conditions, we prove that the distance between these parameters in a heterogeneous economy and those associated with any of the non-dominating consumer homogeneous economies, becomes unbounded as time goes to infinity. 7.1. Market Price of Risk. The next statement provides a full characterization of the market price of risk asymptotics in heterogeneous economies.
Proof. (i) First, we shall prove that lim t→∞ ω it θ it = 0, for all i = I K . As in Section 5, the DDS theorem implies the existence of a Brownian motion B(t) holds for all i = I K , and thus, by (7.1), we have ω it θ it ≤ e −a ′ i t for all i = I K , and some constant a ′ i > 0. Therefore, by Proposition 3.3, we have
The proof of part (i) follows from (7.1), (7.2) and (7.3). (ii) If φ i = φ IK , by part (i) we can substitute θ T by θ IK T . The assertion follows by noting that
Assume now that
By part (i), the claim is equivalent to proving that
First, one checks by employing Lemma 5.3 that the limit ( By exploiting the latter observations and the DDS theorem, one checks that
Here, B i1 (t), B i2 (t) and B i3 (t) denote three independent Brownian motions. By applying the DDS Theorem again, we can rewrite
where B (i) (t) is a Brownian motion, and
Lastly, one checks that lim sup t→∞ |f i (t) − f I k (t)| = ∞ by using the law of iterated logarithm and (7.5), combined with the fact that li
. If at least one of the conditions: γ i = γ IK , β i = β IK and (1 − 1/γ j )ω jt (θ jt − θ t ) 2 for all i = 1, ..., N. We start by treating the second term. Observe that Theorem 4.1, part (i) of Theorem 7.2, (7.4) and (7.2), imply that N j=1
(1 − 1/γ j )ω jt (θ jt − θ t ) 2 ≤ e −a ′ t for some constant a ′ > 0. Next, note that (7.2) yields N j=1,j =IK |ω jt r jt | ≤ N j=1,j =IK e −aj t |r jt | .
As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, one can check that lim sup t→∞ rjt t < ∞ for all j = 1, ..., N , and thus we conclude that |r t − ω IK t r IK t | ≤ e −a ′ t for some constant a ′ > 0. Finally, the proof of item (i) is accomplished by employing the inequality |r t − r IK t | ≤ |r t − ω IK t r IK t | + r IK t |1 − ω IK t |, combined with the fact that 1 = N j=1 ω jt , (7.2) and the fact that lim sup t→∞ rjt t < ∞ for all j = 1, ..., N . (ii) If φ i = φ IK , γ i = γ IK and β i = β IK for some i = I K , the claim follows by combining part (i) with the fact that
Now, if at least one of the indicated conditions fails for some i = I K , the proof is in the same spirit as the one of item (ii) of Theorem 7.2. The only distinction is as follows. If λ = ξ, one can check that the problem can be reduced to proving that where B (1) and B (2) denote two standard independent Brownian motions. By a change of variables, the claim is equivalent to (7.7) lim sup
The law of iterated logarithm yields lim t→∞ where B (1) (t) = √ εB (1) t ε is a Brownian motion (independent of B (2) ), and ε > 0 is sufficiently small. This is a contradiction to (7.9) proving (7.7).
